Habermas on Virtue :: Ethics Morals Papers

Habermas on VirtueAlthough Habermas has never worked out a conception of law and indeed criticizes this notion whenever he uses it, his theory crucially depends on the innocent attitude of participants in conference be it in the realm of democracy and law or that of morality. In this paper, in which I deal only with the honest foundations of morality, I argue first that the norms of discourse which are gained from a presuppositional analysis of speech as such have to be complemented by the sensitive lore on the side of the recipients. Only when the claims are understood in their full significance for the speaker does the discourse live up to the ideal which is already judge in every speech act. This presuppositional analysis shows secondly that it is mainly the virtuous attitude that is morally relevant and not those capacities for acting morally that the agent already possesses. However, the virtuous attitude genuinely entails the obligation to strive to perfect all those cap acities that enable us to sensitively understand the others claim. A discussion of the (discursive) capacities that have to be promoted leads to the singling out of sensitivity as contrasted to immediate empathy. It is the reflexive transcendence of the agents evaluative patterns that allows this emotion to sit well with a post-conventional morality. Finally, I discuss a accomplishable caveat of Wellmer and Habermas who might claim that the proposed conception of virtue would only be valid for participants in discourse, but not for agents acting in the life-world. However, because the discursive virtue is of wide latitude, it does not fall under this objection. The last several years have seen an impressive revival of interest in the concept of virtue. In contrast, the discourse morals of Jrgen Habermas seems to be especially inadequate to account for the ethical significance of virtue, because by emphasizing intersubjective procedures it plays down the importance of individual q ualities. In fact, Habermas uses the status virtue rarely, and where he does use it, he criticizes it harshly for presupposing a shared conception of the good life. (1) However, as I will argue in this paper, there is a conception of deontological virtue which is not only compatible, but indispensable for Habermass theory. Thus, although he attempts to externalize virtue as much as possible into procedures, discourse ethics has to presuppose that the participants possess a genuinely virtuous attitude.